The Dual Meaning of Meaning :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

A primeval problem in the philosophy of language has been to find a federal agency to reconcile get-go someone authority about meaning with externalist theories of meaning. In other words, if meanings arent wholly in the head (the externalist thesis), then how do we condone the apparent authority we have about what our own utterances mean? In this paper, I will present one possible and, I believe, extremely plausible solution which will allow us to maintain that we do have first somebody authority with regard to the meanings of our utterances while free accepting the lessons that Twin Earth has taught us (that meanings are, at least in part, determined by the external world). Moreover, it is, I believe, a virtue of every philosophical theory that it remain as close to common nose out as analytical rigour will allow. Thus, it is advisable that one submit to approach philosophical questions as the layman still untainted by philosophy would approach them. This brand of common sense philosophy is what I shall act to use in providing an account of meaning. Let us begin, then, by examining first person authority. It seems preferably obvious to me that, should there be no successful reconciliation of first person authority with externalism, the former would defeat the latter in either theory of meaning. I do not say this just because it is extremely counter-intuitive to think that we dont generally have a go at it what we mean when we speak, rather it seems to me to be out(predicate) to deny that we have this knowledge not only do we know what we mean, but we know that we know what we mean. Though most philosophers recognise the patency of this fact, some11 maintain that it is in need of an explanation. This, I believe, is because they contract externalism as more than primitive than first person authority. What I mean is that these philosophers approach first person authority from the viewpoint of an already developed externalist theory. I suggest that, instead, we take the undeniability of first person authority as given and then attempt to provide a theory of meaning that preserves first person authority while accounting for the role of the external world in determining meaning. What exactly is it, then, of which we have this direct authoritative knowledge? And how, if at all, does it relate to the external world?